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ABSTRACT 
Australia is currently faced with a strategic and economic dilemma regarding its interactions with China 
and the United States (US). On the one hand, it should maintain and strengthen its strategic relations with the US as 
an ally in order to contain a rising China. On the other hand, Australia should ensure its economic growth by 
strengthening trade relations with China. This paper aims to examine the implications of the new China-Australia 
Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) for the Australia-US alliance (ANZUS). Through qualitative approach, this article 
analyzes the issues with the use of realist perspective in international relations. By assessing two previous events 
involving the triangular Australia-US-China relationship (the case of the Taiwan conflict and the US development of 
a National Missile Defense system), this paper summaries three findings: a fundamental shift in the way Australia 
perceives China; ChAFTA offers more benefits to Australia than the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 
(AUSFTA); and finally, the US is irreplaceable in Australia’s national security despite the benefits of trade with 
China. 
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ABSTRAK 
Australia saat ini dihadapkan dengan dilema strategis dan ekonomi mengenai interaksinya dengan China 
dan Amerika Serikat (AS). Di satu sisi, ia harus mempertahankan dan memperkuat hubungan strategisnya dengan 
AS sebagai sekutu untuk membendung kebangkitan Cina. Di sisi lain, Australia harus memastikan pertumbuhan 
ekonomi dengan memperkuat hubungan perdagangannya dengan China. Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk melihat 
implikasi dari Perjanjian Perdagangan Bebas China-Australia (ChAFTA) terhadap aliansi Australia-AS (ANZUS).  
Melalui pendekatan kualitatif, artikel ini menganalisa topik tersebut dengan menggunakan pandangan realis dalam 
hubungan internasional. Dengan mereview dua peristiwa sebelumnya yang melibatkan hubungan segitiga 
Australia-AS-Cina (kasus konflik Taiwan, dan pengembangan sistem Pertahanan Rudal Nasional AS), tulisan ini 
merangkum tiga argumen: perubahan mendasar dalam cara Australia memandang Cina; ChAFTA menawarkan 
lebih banyak manfaat bagi Australia daripada Perjanjian Perdagangan Bebas Australia-AS (AUSFTA); dan 
Amerika Serikat tidak akan tergantikan dalam kepentingan keamanan nasional Australia meskipun keuntungan 
perdagangan dengan Cina. 
 
Kata kunci: Australia; Cina; ChAFTA; ANZUS 
 
 
Introduction  
In the field of international relations, 
commercial liberals believe that economic 
cooperation can forestall or reduce the 
likelihood of conflict. The purpose of trade 
amongst countries is essentially to share 
economic benefits between each other, as well 
as to build strong relationships. A great deal of 
trade nowadays is set up by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) which facilitates not only 
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bilateral but also multilateral Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs).1 One example of a bilateral 
FTA is the China Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (ChAFTA). After signing the Trade 
and Economic Framework in 2003, both 
Australia and the People’s Republic of China 
made further bilateral commitments to enter into 
a new phase of FTA negotiation.2 Clearly, this 
represented a further strengthening of economic 
relations between Australia and China. Yet, 
some argue that China is actually using its trade 
cooperation to seek power in the Asia Pacific.3 
To be more precise, China is using trade as the 
means to build a soft hegemony in the Asia 
Pacific in order to become a superpower. 
Unfortunately, many are very concerned that 
China may then adapt America’s model of the 
Monroe Doctrine to assert its regional rise, 
thereby challenging US’ power in the Asia 
Pacific.4 Others maintain that China is using its 
economic influence to search for great power 
potential to weaken the US regional primacy in 
Asia Pacific, and Australia has become 
entangled in that tactic.5  
In November 2011 the former US 
President Barrack Obama announced his new 
approach to East Asia in the Australian 
                                                             
1 L. L. He & R. Sappideen. Free trade agreements and 
the US-China-Australia relationship in the Asia-
Pacific region. Asia Pacific Law Review 21, 1, pp.55. 
2013.  
2 M. Vaile, MP (former minister for trade). Australia-
China Trade and Economic Framework (2003, 
October 24). Retrieved from 
http://trademinister.gov.au/releases/2003/mvt085_03.
html 
3 T. Lum, W. M. Morrison, and B. Vaughn, China’s 
“Soft Power” in Southeast Asia. CRS report for 
Congress, pp. 1.  2008. 
4 H. White, Power Shift: rethinking Australia’s place 
in the Asian Century. Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 65, 1,  pp. 84   
5 D. Blumenthal, Strengthening the US-Australia 
Alliance: Progress and Pitfalls. American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research 29, pp. 5. 2005. 
Parliament called “The Pivot”.6 Obama 
emphasized that The Pivot or strategic rebalance 
toward Asia could be achieved in a number of 
ways, one of which is the strengthening of 
bilateral security ties with the US allies in Asia, 
including Australia.7 Strengthening bilateral 
security ties included the US military bases 
involvement in the regional multilateral 
institutions, and the extension of trade and 
investment links such as the proposed Trans 
Pacific Partnership (TPP)8, which is 
unfortunately opposed by the current President 
of the US Donald Trump.9 This paper argues 
that the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement 
may make their relationship stronger in terms of 
economic factors, but Australia would not risk 
its national security in the expense of ChAFTA. 
This paper will first examine the ChAFTA in 
comparison with AUSFTA, and then assess its 
implications for the Australia-US alliance 
(ANZUS).10 Two previous regional events 
(related to Taiwan and the US National Missile 
Defense (NMD)) will be scrutinized to illustrate 
the changing nature of the triangular 
relationship. The issues will be analyzed using 
realist perspective in international relations. 
 
                                                             
6 B. He, Collaborative and Conflictive Trilateralism: 
Perspectives from Australia, China, and America. 
Asian Survey 54, 2, pp. 267. 2014.   
7 Ibid, pp. 268   
8 Ibid. 
9 E. White, Financial Times, (2018, April 18). Trump 
says he is now opposed to re-joining TPP, Retrieved 
from https://www.ft.com/content/ed6b16f4-42b5-
11e8-803a-295c97e6fd0b 
10 ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and United 
States) is a strategic alliance established on 1 
September 1951. This alliance is created as a result of 
the aftermath of the war in the Pacific. This is neither 
a regional pact in comparison with the North Atlantic 
Organization (NATO), nor a bilateral treaty which 
seek for assistance, economic or military. See Joint 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, The 
ANZUS Alliance (pp. 1). Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service. 1982. 
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Background: The China-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (ChAFTA) compared to Australia-
US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) 
 
The notion of ChAFTA first emerged in 
the Australia-China Trade and Economic 
Framework agreement signed in Canberra on 24 
October 2003 by Mark Vaile as a representative 
of Prime Minister John Howard and Yu 
Guangzhou as representative of President Hu 
Jintao.11 The framework stated that the 
government of Australia and the People’s 
Republic of China agreed to conduct a detailed 
joint feasibility study into the benefits of a FTA. 
The subsequent Joint Feasibility Study 
completed in March 2005.12 A collaboration 
between the Centre of Policy Studies of Monash 
University and the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences and Nankai University using economic 
modeling the study concluded that a ChAFTA 
could provide significant output and job 
opportunities for both China and Australia. The 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
(DFAT) noted that:  
 
If (ACFTA) had commenced from 2006, 
'Australia's real GDP would receive a 
US$18 billion (A$24.4 billion) boost in 
present value terms over the period 2006-
15, and China's real GDP would increase 
by up to US$64 billion (A$86.9 billion) 
over the same period.13 
 
On completion of the Joint Feasibility 
Study, Prime Minister John Howard went to 
China in April 2005 and entered into FTA 
negotiations with Premier Wen Jiabao.14 In 
November 2014, following long negotiations, a 
                                                             
11 A. Clarke & X. Gao, Bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements: A comparative analysis of the Australia-
United States FTA and the forthcoming Australia-
China FTA. UNSW Law Journal 30, 3, pp. 846. 2007. 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid, pp. 847 
14 Ibid 
Declaration of Intent was signed by the 
Australian Trade and Investment Minister 
Andrew Robb and the Chinese Commerce 
Minister Gao Hucheng. It stated that the new 
ChAFTA had formally entered into force.15  
By implementing ChAFTA, both 
countries expect to increase trade and share the 
benefits. According to data from DFAT, almost 
all of Australia’s resources, energy and 
manufacturing exports would enter China duty-
free within four years of the agreement (2019).16 
ChAFTA is expected to enhance the 
competiveness of Australian agricultural exports 
to China, eliminating tariffs on meat, dairy and 
wine. It is believed Australian consumers and 
businesses will have access to cheaper and a 
more diverse range of Chinese goods and 
services.17 ChAFTA will deliver Australian 
services providers a significant leg-up in the 
Chinese economy. ChAFTA will also promote 
Chinese investment in Australia, fuelling future 
economic growth by lifting the screening 
threshold for private Chinese investments in 
non-sensitive sectors.18 Specifically, ChAFTA 
set China’s tariffs at zero over 85 per cent (by 
2015 value) of Australian exports would enter 
China duty free or at preferential tariff rates by 
the time it came into force. This amount would 
increase to 93 per cent coverage by 1 January 
2019 and 98 per cent when ChAFTA is fully 
implemented. Australian import tariffs has been 
set by ChAFTA at zero on 82 per cent of 
China’s exports to Australia from day one, 
                                                             
15 Australian Embassy (China), (2014, November 
17). Statement at announcement of conclusion of 
FTA negotiations. Retrieved from 
http://china.embassy.gov.au/bjng/HOMstatement.htm
l 
16 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. China-
Australia Free Trade Agreement. Retrieved from 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-
force/chafta/fact-sheets/Pages/fact-sheet-resources-
energy-and-manufacturing.aspx 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid 
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rising to 100 per cent tariff elimination by 1 
January 2019.19 
In comparison, many observers believe 
that the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 
(AUSFTA) offers fewer benefits to Australia. 
For example, the AUSFTA failed to cover all 
sectors, excluding sugar, and forestalling the 
removal of tariffs on Australian beef and dairy.20 
The exclusion of sugar has been discussed by 
Australian farmers as well as some American 
commentators, maintaining that it is inconsistent 
with Bush’s statements regarding the opening of 
all sectors under AUSFTA. DFAT stated that:  
 
Sugar was a sensitive issue for the United 
States ... and it did not prove possible for 
the United States to offer to increase 
current access. Faced with a decision of 
whether to walk away from the 
negotiations, the Government decided that 
the potential benefits from AUSFTA as a 
whole did not justify denying those benefits 
to the rest of the Australian community for 
the sake of one – albeit very important-
agricultural sub-sector.21 
 
In short, it can be argued that AUSFTA 
was in some respects disappointing for 
Australia. As a consequence, it may have 
produced a shift in the way Australia perceives 
its relations with the US. Indeed, as observed by 
Kelton, there was a structural fragility in 
Australia’s efforts to respond to shifts in the 
international system, in particular to the 
formulation of policy choices towards the US in 
terms of the delivery of trade outcomes 
                                                             
19 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Guiding 
to using ChAFTA to export or import. Retrieved 
from https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-
force/chafta/doing-business-with-china/Pages/guide-
to-using-chafta-to-export-or-import.aspx  
20 Clarke and Gao, op.cit., pp. 844   
21 Ibid, pp. 845   
concerning AUSFTA.22 Moreover, Armstrong 
found that there was not only a reduction in 
trade between the US and Australia but also in 
their exports and imports. The coefficient 
estimate (in proportional change terms) for trade 
between the United States and Australia due to 
AUSFTA is -0.304.23 He also maintained that 
trade diversion had occurred as a result of 
AUSFTA due to the collapse of US trade in 
2008 and global finance crisis. Interestingly, he 
observed that the trade diversion between 
Australia-US may have fallen without the 
implementation of AUSFTA.24  
Regarding ChAFTA, this agreement is 
expected to offer greater benefits to Australia 
despite the fact that it failed to deal with sugar in 
AUSFTA (failed also to deal with tariffs for 
cotton, rice, and wheat).25 Even so, ChAFTA 
covers other important sectors which were not 
covered in AUSFTA such as dairy products, 
beef, mining and wine. Tariffs on these products 
will be scrapped as well China’s tariffs on 
Australian resources and energy products.26 
Indeed, for Australian Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott, ChAFTA is good for the Australian 
economy:  
 
“In particular it is a very good day for 
Australia. And this agreement is the first 
that China has concluded with a 
                                                             
22 M. Kelton, More than an Ally? Contemporary 
Australia-US Relations (pp.1). Ashgate Publishing 
Limited (England) & Ashgate Publishing Company 
(USA). 2008.  
23 S. Armstrong, The economic impact of the 
Australia-US Free Trade Agreement’ AJRC working 
paper 01/2015 (pp. 10). Australian: ANU Australia-
Japan Research Center. 2015.  
24 Ibid 
25 L. Barbour, (2014, 18 November). Free trade 
agreement Dairy farmers set to big winners in deal 
between Australia and China (para. 3). Retrieved 
from http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-
16/australia-looks-set-to-sign-a-free-trade-agreement-
with-china/5895012.  
26 Ibid, para. 4-5  
45 Johni R. V. Korwa | The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA): Its Implications for Australia-United States 
Relations 
 
substantial economy, with a major 
economy and it is the most comprehensive 
agreement that China has concluded with 
anyone.27 
 
A glance at Australia’s trade and 
investment with China in 2013-14 provides 
some insight into the benefits of ChAFTA for 
Australia. Australia’s top five exports such as 
iron ore and concentrates ($A57.0b), coal 
($9.3b), gold ($8.1b), education-related services 
($4.1b), and copper ($2.1b) are delivered to 
China.28 Australia’s top five imports from China 
include clothing ($5.1b), telecommunications 
equipment and parts ($4.9b), computers ($4.8b), 
furniture, mattresses, and cushions ($2.2b), and 
prams, toys, games and sporting goods ($1.8b).29 
China has become Australia’s biggest trading 
partner ensuring around $160 billion in trade 
during 2013-14, accounting for 25 % of 
Australia’s total trade. Australia’s investment 
relationship with China is also increased 
considerably, starting from only $1 billion in 
2003 to around $32 billion in 2013, thus making 
China Australia’s eighth-largest source of 
investment.30 
Looking in more detail at triangular 
trade in 2013, China was by far Australia’s 
largest export destination in terms of goods and 
services, accounting for around 10.3 % share of 
the total Australia’s global export, while the US 
stood in the second place (at 9.6 % share).31 In 
                                                             
27 Ibid, para. 10-11  
28 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
ChAFTA snapshot infographic.  
Retrieved from 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-
force/chafta/fact-sheets/Pages/chafta-snapshot-
infographic.aspx 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid 
31 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Australia’s Trade and Economic Statistics. Retrieved 
from http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-
investment/trade-at-a-glance/trade-at-a-glance-
contrast, the US dominated about 11.9 % share 
of Australia’s global imports in terms of goods 
and services, followed by China (9.8 % share).32 
With regard to the two-trading partners, on the 
other hand, China still remained the most 
important country for Australia accounting for a 
23.3 % share of total goods and services, 
followed by Japan (10.9 % share) and the US 
(8.4 % share).33 In a nutshell, it is clear that 
China is a more important partner for Australia 
in terms of trade. 
 
The impact of ChAFTA on the Australia-US 
alliance (ANZUS)  
In order to assess the impact of 
ChAFTA on the future of the strategic Australia-
US alliance (ANZUS), two previous events 
regarding the triangular relationship will be 
examined; first, the case of China-US tensions 
over Taiwan, and second, the case of US 
development of a National Missile Defense 
system (NMD). During the 1996 Sino-American 
confrontation over Taiwan and China again 
claimed Taiwan as part of its territory and 
reiterated the need for reunification in which 
Beijing reasserted ‘One China policy’. The US, 
which had supported Taiwan for some time in 
order to contain communism, intervened and 
asserted that reunification by force was 
forbidden.34 This standoff pressured Canberra, a 
US ally in the Asia Pacific to take a position. 
Initially, Australia’s Foreign Minister, 
Alexander Downer, urged China’s Ambassador 
to exercise restraint.35 Downer even tacitly 
referred to the placement of two US aircraft 
                                                                                           
2014/Pages/performance-03-australias-trade-and-
economic-statistics.aspx  
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid 
34 K. Lieberthal, Preventing a war over Taiwan. 
Foreign Affairs 84, 2, pp. 2. 2005.   
35 W. Tom and L. Hay, Australia, the United States 
and a ‘China growing strong’: managing conflict 
avoidance.  Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 55, 1, pp. 40. 2001.   
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carriers east of Taiwan. Consequently, Sino-
Australian relations cooled over the following 
months.36 
However, the Howard government 
subsequently changed its tune. In late 1996, the 
Chief of the Australian Defense Force (ADF), 
General John Baker, visited China in order to 
rebuild the relationship.37 In the following year, 
Australia and China committed themselves to 
annual discussions on regional security, and 
opened certain avenues for their military officers 
to study at each other’s strategic institutes.38 In 
order to further strengthen Australia’s relations 
with China, Prime Minister John Howard visited 
China in 1997 and clearly explained that 
Australia’s relations with China would be 
considered in Australia’s national interests. He 
also emphasized the importance of the ‘One 
China policy’ in which Australia and the US 
acknowledged Taiwan as an integral part of 
China, emphasizing that Taiwan should not be 
incorporated by the use of force.39  
The gradual restoration of Sino-
Australia relations placed Australia in a dilemma 
with regards to the strategic alliance with the 
US, a dilemma illustrated by the so-called 
‘Armitage Scenario’. In 1999, Richard 
Armitage, a former US Assistant Secretary of 
Defense visited Australia and made strong 
statements about Australian military support for 
the US in the event of a Sino-Taiwanese 
conflict. Further, it was suggested, if Australia 
failed to provide such support, then the ANZUS 
treaty would need to be re-evaluated.40 These 
statements seem to bring into question the 
security guarantee the ANZUS alliance 
implicitly provided Australia. If the conflict over 
Taiwan was to be repeated and Australia did not 
                                                             
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid, pp. 41   
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid, pp. 42 
join the US in that conflict, it may have 
repercussions for the Alliance.  
In response to the ‘Armitage Scenario’, 
President Jiang Zimen firmly warned Australia 
about the “very serious consequences’ of 
intervening in a US-Taiwan conflict. President 
Zimen again responded to Armitage’s statements 
when he visited Australia the following week.41 
During the visit Prime Minister Howard stated 
that Australia’s position would be to remain 
neutral in the case of a US-China conflict over 
Taiwan. Thus, despite pressure from the US, 
Australia stood firm, announcing a two-pronged 
policy approach emphasizing Australia’s neutral 
position.42 Subsequently, Australia and China 
advanced their bilateral trade relations, signing 
several agreements facilitating the export of 
Australian minerals, and the negotiations for the 
export of Australian liquid natural gas (LNG) to 
China.43  
In the case of the US National Missile 
Defense system (NMD), here Australia was 
pressured by the US to work closely on the 
development of a “high technology defense 
force”. Indeed, Harvard University strategic 
analyst Robert D. Blackwill, a specialist in US 
alliance relations in Asia, pressured Australia to 
become actively involved in the American-led 
NMD.44 Interestingly, even though Australia had 
previously participated in missiles research and 
development, on this occasion it refused to play 
a significant role in the development of the 
NMD. In September 1997, for instance, 
Australia would not fully engage with the US in 
the project DUNDEE (Down Under Early 
Warning Experiments) which included the 
involvement of Australia’s JINDALEE over-the-
horizon radar which enabled to monitor air and 
                                                             
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid 
43 Ibid, pp. 42-43   
44 Ibid, pp. 43   
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sea movements and launching ballistic missiles 
in the Asia Pacific.45  
Furthermore, Australian decision 
makers also made clear Australia’s 
unwillingness to participate in the development 
of the NMD. As stated by Defense Minister Ian 
McLachlan in August 1997, “it is prudent that 
we [Australia] acquire an understanding of 
ballistic missile defense technology’ but that 
Australia has no intention of developing an 
indigenous system of its own.”46 Clearly, even 
though Australia desires to work closely with the 
US to develop missile defense technology, it 
will not do this by itself. Having said that, 
Australia still played an indirect role in ensuring 
various types of missile defense operations with 
the US such as facilitating the possible 
deployment of a Theatre Missile Defense 
(TMD) network in order to counter China’s 
missile development aimed at Taiwan.47  
In this context, China had made some 
efforts to weaken Australia’s collaboration with 
the US. This can be seen in Chinese press 
commentaries condemning US regional allies for 
possible participation in the NMD.48 By 
strengthening trade relations with Australia 
through ChAFTA, Beijing believed it might be 
able to reduce Australia’s involvement in NMD, 
and thereby also weaken the ANZUS alliance. 
Beijing also endeavored to push Australia away 
from ANZUS by proposing Australia become a 
predominantly region-centric power, one 
concerned with security measures in the Asia 
Pacific, such as acting as a peacekeeping forces 
East Timor, and encouraging Australia to join 
the biannual Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM).49 
Two cases seem to illustrate that 
Australia’s position is not as consistent or 
predictable as might be expected with regard to 
                                                             
45 Ibid, pp. 44   
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid, pp. 45 
49 Ibid 
its principle partners. Australia’s neutral position 
regarding Taiwan, and its ambivalence toward 
the NMD, seem to indicate a desire to avoid 
harming its trade relations with China.50 
Regarding the ANZUS treaty, this offers a 
number of benefits to Australia including 
national security, access to US intelligence 
networks, and access to US military training.51 
Yet the Treaty may not necessarily guarantee 
Australia’s security in the future if China 
successfully transfers its economic power into 
military power, thereby challenging the US. This 
is perhaps due to vague commitments in the 
Treaty, particularly article IV which states:  
“Each Party recognizes that an armed 
attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties 
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety 
and declares that it would act to meet the 
common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional processes.52 
 
This article is quite different to the 
equivalent NATO Article 5 which states:  
“The Parties agree that an armed attack 
against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an 
attack against them all and…. including the 
use of armed force, to restore and maintain 
the security of the North Atlantic area”53 
                                                             
50 G. Brown and L. Rayner, (2001, August 28). 
Upside, Downside: ANZUS: After 50 years. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliament
ary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications
_Archive/CIB/cib0102/02CIB03 
51 N. Bisley, An ally for all the years to come: why 
Australia is not a conflicted US ally. Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 67, 4, pp. 405. 2013.   
52 Report from the Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defense, the ANZUS Alliance, 
Australian Government Publishing Service (Annex A 
– Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, 
and the United States of America), Canberra. 1982.   
53 The North Atlantic Treaty. 1949. 
Retrieved from. 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publ
ications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf  
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Despite the vague wording of the ANZUS 
treaty, Australia’s connection with the US is on 
the most important interest for Australian 
defence policy. As mentioned in the 2016 
Defence White Paper that “the US will continue 
to be Australia’s most important strategic 
partner through our long-standing alliance…”54 
While it is true that China is now playing an 
important trade partner with Australia 
(ChAFTA), Canberra would never ever replace 
the US in the Australian national security 
concerns. Even though economic cooperation 
remains important, states always refer back to 
national security as the number one concern. 
 
Analysis: Realist perspective on ChAFTA 
and its implications for the Alliance 
Realists argue that the international 
system is characterized by anarchy, and that 
competition between countries is inevitable. 
National security and international order is 
secured through shifting balances of power in a 
system of ‘self-help’. By accruing power, a state 
will ensure its existence in the international 
system.55 Currently, China seems to be seeking 
power through the development of anapproach 
which includes the use of FTAs and perhaps 
ChAFTA. Hugh White observes that China may 
replace the US over the next 30 years as the 
largest economy in the world, particularly if 
China’s economy grows as it did in the last 30 
years.56 Likewise, John Maersheimer maintains 
that China, which has a huge population in 
comparison with the US, has significantly 
developed its economy since the early 1980s. If 
                                                             
54 The 2016 Defence White Paper, 
www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/2016-defence-
white-paper.pdf 
55 J. Grieco, G. J. Ikenberry, and M. Mastanduno, 
Introduction to International Relations: enduring 
questions and contemporary perspectives (pp. 72). 
Palgrave: Great Britain. 2015. 
56 White, Power shift: rethinking Australia’s place in 
the Asian century, op. cit., p. 82.   
China, Maersheimer emphasizes, continues to 
increase its economic power in the years to 
come, this may be transferred into material 
military power and thus challenge the military 
primacy of the US in East Asia.57 
 Realists are interested in how peace and 
order can be secured through the formation of 
alliances, particularly in order to counter-
balance the rise of a new powerful state.58  In the 
case of the rise of China, it is clear that the US is 
very concerned, prompting the shift in focus 
from the Middle East to Asia, as marked by the 
withdrawal of troops from Iraq and 
Afghanistan.59 Apart from this, the US also 
endeavors to contain China’s rise by 
strengthening strategic alliances such as 
ANZUS. This can be seen in the Australian-
United States Ministerial Meeting (AUSMIN) in 
2015 and 2018, where the respective leaders 
committed to strengthening ANZUS and trade 
relations in order to contain the re-emergence of 
China.60 
 With regards to the signing of ChAFTA, 
this has assisted the economic and strategic re-
emergence of China through trade. This is 
seemingly acknowledged in Australia’s defense 
white papers. The 2013 and 2017 Defense White 
Paper is totally contrary to the previous Defense 
White Paper of 2009 which underscored China 
as a threat. In contrast both paper declared that 
                                                             
57 J. J. Maersheimer, ‘Structural Realism’, in T. 
Dunne, M. Kurki and S. Smith (2nd edition), 
International Relations Theories: Discipline and 
Diversity (pp. 89), United States of America: Oxford 
University Press. 2010. 
58 Grieco, Ikenberry, and Mastanduno, op.cit, pp. 74   
59 H. Clinton, America’s Pacific Century. Foreign 
Policy 189, pp. 57.  2011. 
60 U.S. Department of State, ‘2015 Australia-United 
States Ministerial (AUSMIN) Joint Statement’, 
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See also Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
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Australia “Welcomes China’s rise” and 
acknowledged the development of China’s 
economy as a cornerstone to increase its military 
power naturally.61 Prime Minister John Howard 
acknowledged that China’s economic growth 
was linked to Australia’s prosperity and trade 
relations with China.62 Even though there are 
regular AUSMIN meetings between Australia 
and the US, it must be said that Australia now 
perceives China differently. 
 The US, in these circumstances, is 
expected to admit the re-emergence of China as 
a natural process in the international system. As 
observed by Lee, there were not any countries 
that increased military capability as well as 
economic sector outside of the US-led Western 
alliance system and rising as a great power since 
the post War-World Two; yet China did.63 
China, one of five permanent members of the 
UN Security Council, should be acknowledged 
as a great power because no one can argue that 
Beijing is now expanding its influence to pursue 
hegemony in the Asia Pacific through FTAs 
with Australia, New Zealand and ASEAN. 
Indeed, John Maersheimer, in examining great 
powers in action, found that regional hegemony 
would be always sought by powerful states to 
increase their power as well as to ensure their 
survival in the international system.64 
 Avery Goldstein observes that, in the 
post-Cold War era of the early of twenty first 
century, China’s leaders have endeavored to not 
                                                             
61 J. Lee, Australia’s 2015 Defense White Paper; 
Seeking Strategic Opportunity in Southeast Asia to 
Help Manage China’s Peaceful Rise. Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 35, 3, p. 400. 2013. See also The 2017 
Foreign Policy White Paper (Australian 
Government), Retrieved from 
https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/file/2651/download
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63 Lee, op.cit., pp. 401   
64 J. J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics (p. 168). USA: W. Norton and Company. 
2001. 
only to deal with shifts in the nature of the 
international system, but also to ensure the re-
emergence of their country as a great power. 
These efforts produced a new grand strategy in 
China’s foreign policy in the late 1990s.65 
Beijing believed that the bipolarity of the Cold-
War was replaced by a new era of unipolarity 
which in turn opens certain avenues to 
multipolarity. China perceived this multipolarity 
as an opportunity for its peaceful re-emergence 
in the international system.66 Yet, others 
maintain that China is essentially seeking greater 
status in the international system or, to a lesser 
extent, they argue that China seeks to challenge 
the hegemony of the US.67 
 Canberra is very concerned to retain the 
US as a strategic ally, but it is also committed to 
ensuring its good economic relationship with 
China through ChAFTA. As argued by 
Rosecrance, while it is true that Australia may 
cooperate with the US to contain the re-
emergence of China, this does not mean 
Australia has to put its relations with China in 
danger.68 Indeed, as Shannon Tow observes, 
there is a view amongst international relations 
scholars that ‘junior allies’ might have a choice 
whether or not to underpin their senior allies, or 
change position in response to the rise of a 
challenger.69 Prime Minister Kevin Rudd also 
maintained that Australia should consider the 
way it treats China and the US or, to be more 
precise, while Australian should consider China 
an “important partner”, the US should be 
                                                             
65 A. Goldstein, ‘An emerging China’s emerging 
grand strategy’, in G. J. Ikenberry & M. Mastanduno 
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66 Ibid   
67 Ibid, pp. 59   
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regarded as a “strategically important partner”.70 
It seems that the way Australia perceives the US 
as part of ANZUS look differently. 
  
Conclusion: ChAFTA and the Alliance 
The signing of the China-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) marks a significant 
milestone in the bilateral relationship, and 
represents an instrument for strengthening the 
relationship for the years to come. No one can 
argue that Australia’s economic growth is tied to 
China’s economic growth through mineral 
exports in particular. The US may view this 
strengthening relationship differently. Whilst the 
US appears to be trying to strategically contain 
the re-emergence of China, Australia is 
simultaneously entering into a new trade 
relationship with China. As demonstrated by 
previous ‘strategic’ pressures from the US, in 
particular the Taiwan and NMD episodes, 
Australia appears to be increasingly determined 
not to jeopardize its economic relations with 
China. Nevertheless, Australia still considers the 
US as the strategic partner which cannot be 
replaced in terms of the national security. In 
addition, by using realist perspective to approach 
the triangular Australia-US-China relationship, 
the rise of China and the implication of 
ChAFTA for Australia-US relations can be 
clearly analyzed. 
In short, there are at least three 
assumptions outlined in this paper. First, there is 
a fundamental shift in the way Australia now 
perceives China. Australia is now strongly 
economically integrated into the Asia Pacific 
economic region, particularly Chinese economic 
development. Australia has come to understand 
that integrating itself into the Asia Pacific region 
will ensure its future both economically and 
politically.71 Second, Australia may consider 
that ChAFTA is more economically beneficial in 
comparison with the AUSFTA. As discussed, 
                                                             
70 He, op.cit, pp. 258   
71 Tow and Hay, op.cit. pp. 38   
even though AUSFTA has been in place since 
early 2004,72 it does not seem to have provided 
the economic benefits Australia had hoped. In 
fact, there is a reduction in trade between the US 
and Australia under AUSFTA, as well as trade 
dispersion. Third, despite the fact that ChAFTA 
brings economic benefit greatly to Australia, 
Australia would not risk its national security in 
the expense of ChAFTA. An Australia-US 
relation is paternalistic. This means that the US 
is irreplaceable in Australia’s national interest, 
whereas China remains a great threat for 
Australia’s security. Trade is highly important 
for Australia, but states security always come 
first.  
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